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It is both a pleasure and a great honour to contribute to this collection 
remembering Denis Edwards. Denis and I were at many meetings together, 
and his infallible courtesy and quiet kindness left a deep impression on me, 
as did his ever-humble, ever-searching enquiry into the things of God and 
the world. In August 2012 a group of us walked most of the way up a South 
African mountain – Denis making fine pace despite less than ideal 
equipment. Only when it came on to snow did he judiciously point out that 
we were without map, food or mobile phone and it might be wise to settle for 
reaching the waterfall. With Denis there was always wisdom and 
judiciousness, and there was always a waterfall – the healing torrent of his 
strong sense of the compassion of God and the strength of the Holy Spirit. 
 
I want to honour Denis by picking up an old exchange of ours, and using it 
to develop my current thinking in dialogue with his work. Some years ago 
we were at a colloquium on ecological issues and a colleague remarked, 
almost in passing, that whatever formulations were attempted, there always 
had to be a fall-event at the centre of the narrative. Denis and I smiled 
quietly to one another, because in both our minds was a sense that the 
dominant Western Christian position - that a primal human sin disorders 
the whole creation - is no longer sustainable, and that an ecological theology 
must be developed out of an evolutionary narrative that can find no place for 
such a sudden, late-onset disordering of the cosmos into its Darwinian 
state.1 
                                                        
1 See Edwards, Denis, The God of Evolution: a trinitarian theology (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1999) for a durable account of the possibilities and challenges 
of this sort of theology. Also Southgate, Christopher, ‘Cosmic Evolution and 
Evil’ in The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil ed. Chad Meister 
 
Where then can lie the origin of the disvalues in a Darwinian creation - 
violence between creatures, suffering caused by predation, parasitism and 
disease, and the extinction of almost all species that have ever existed?2 
Michael Lloyd comes to the conclusion that the only satisfactory account is 
one based on the rebellion of angels before the creation of the present 
universe.3 That account suffers from two major problems: first, the power 
that has to be accorded to the angels to frustrate the intentions of the 
Creator of all things ex nihilo; second, the inescapable scientific conclusion 
that it is the same process of evolution by natural selection that gives rise 
both to creaturely diversity, beauty, and ingenuity of adaptation and to the 
disvalues listed above.  
 
Much more challenging for ‘fall-free’ accounts of an evolving creation4 are 
the proposals of Neil Messer, invoking Barth’s ‘Das Nichtige’5 and Celia 
Deane-Drummond, drawing on Bulgakov’s language of ‘Shadow Sophia’.6 
Both invoke a mysterious constraint on divine activity in creation. A great 
deal turns on the nature of this constraint on God’s capacity to create a 
world where there is creaturely flourishing without creaturely struggle, 
competition and violence. If the constraint is construed as a spiritual force, 
then old concerns that exercised the early Christian theologians about 
dualistic formulations resurface. A God who, from the beginning, has been 
in a battle with contrary spiritual forces powerful enough to radically alter 
                                                        
and Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 147-
64. In this regard it is interesting to note Stanley Rosenberg’s recent re-
reading of Augustine, in which he suggests that Augustine’s prelapsarian 
world, ‘very good’ and under the providence of the sovereign God, already 
includes thorns and poisonous snakes. It may not after all be necessary for 
Augustinians to perform somersaults in order to assign all apparent 
disvalues in creation to human sin. Rosenberg, Stanley, ‘Can Nature be ‘Red 
in Tooth and Claw’ in the thought of Augustine?’ in Finding Ourselves after 
Darwin: Conversations on the Image of God, Original Sin, and the Problem of 
Evil ed. Stanley Rosenberg, Michael Burdett, Michael Lloyd and Benno van 
den Toren (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2018), pp. 183-96. 
2 See Southgate, Christopher, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution and 
the Problem of Evil (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), Ch. 
1, for a justification of this list. 
3 Lloyd, Michael, ‘The Fallenness of Nature: Three Non-Human Suspects’ in 
Finding Ourselves after Darwin, pp. 211-24. 
4 Such as Bethany Sollereder has formulated in her God, Evolution and 
Animal Suffering: Theodicy without a Fall (London: Routledge, 2018). 
5  Messer, Neil, Science in Theology (London: Bloomsbury, in press),                  
see also his ‘Evolution and Theodicy: How (Not) to do Science and Theology’, 
Zygon 53(3) (2018): 821-35. 
6  Deane-Drummond, Celia, ‘Perceiving Natural Evil through the Lens of 
Divine Glory?’ Zygon 53(3) (2018): 792-807. 
 
the character of any creation to which God might give rise, is no longer the 
sovereign Lord of the cosmos whose ontological priority and absolute 
goodness guarantees the goodness of creation. If on the other hand the 
constraint on God’s creative action is not an opposing agency but some form 
of logical constraint, how can the logic be demonstrated?7  
 
I identify a spectrum of formulations in the recent literature. Lloyd’s angelic 
fall sits at one end of the spectrum, as the position most explicitly informed 
by a sense of the rebellion of identifiable freely-choosing beings. Next I 
would place Nicola Hoggard Creegan, for whom the disvalues in creation are 
like the ‘tares’ in the parable of the wheat and the tares in the Gospel of 
Matthew (Mt. 13.24-30KJV).8 The appearance of the tares of disvalue is 
ultimately mysterious, but the parable’s witness that they are sown by an 
‘enemy’ (Mt. 13.25), suggests that Hoggard Creegan too invokes a 
consciously rebellious force. 
 
In the middle of our spectrum we might place Messer, working from Barth, 
and Deane-Drummond, working from Bulgakov. The constraint on God’s 
perfect freedom is a mystery, not a conscious resistance. As I have 
suggested,9 this position is metastable – when the appeal to mystery on 
which they rest is subject to closer questioning, these approaches would 
necessarily collapse either into a conscious opposing spiritual force, or a 
form of logical constraint.  
 
Perhaps the instincts of Paul Fiddes belong next on our spectrum. Fiddes 
after a very careful analysis of the ‘non-being’ tradition, which he traces 
back to Plotinus, seeks to avoid the conclusion that natural evil is a logical 
necessity. He writes.. 
 
Some overall vision of the ‘responsiveness’ and ‘resistance’ of creation 
to the Spirit of God is needed for a doctrine of creative evolution, for a 
proper theodicy, and certainly for the claim… that God suffers conflict 
with a non-being which is alien to him. It may be that process thought 
is pointing in a direction whose destination we do not yet have the 
conceptual tools to map..10 
 
                                                        
7 This is in effect Lloyd’s challenge to me in his summary of the debate, 
Finding Ourselves after Darwin, p. 261. 
 
8 Hoggard Creegan, Nicola, ‘Theodicy: A Response to Christopher Southgate, 
Zygon 53(3) (2018):808-20. 
9 Southgate, Christopher ‘Response with a Select Bibliography’, Zygon 53(3) 
(2018):909-30. 
10 Fiddes, Paul S., The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991), p. 228. 
For Fiddes the resistance is not logically necessary, nor is it malevolent, but 
it is inevitable.11 One could place here also process theologians and others 
influenced by process thought such as John Haught. 
 
At the far end of this spectrum of positions would be a forthright acceptance 
that the world unfolding through the processes of Darwinian evolution is the 
world God intended to make. The evolutionary theologian has a choice here. 
Is this decision of God’s an unconstrained decision to create disvalue along 
with value? That would drive the interpreter of creation back towards an 
appeal to mystery, though also to texts in the Hebrew Bible such as ‘See 
now that I, even I, am he; there is no god besides me. I kill and I make alive; 
I wound and I heal; and no one can deliver from my hand.’ (Deut 32.39), 
‘The Lord kills and brings to life; he brings down to Sheol and raises up.’ (1. 
Sam. 2.6) and Deutero-Isaiah’s description of God as the author of ‘weal and 
woe alike’ (Is. 45.7). 
 
It is at least worth considering whether centuries of philosophical reflection 
on the doctrine of God have taken Christian thought too far from these 
formulations. They survive within liturgy in protest and lament after 
disaster, as I have recently explored.12 They survive in a depersonalised form 
in the influential and persuasive thought of Wesley Wildman, with his 
appeal to an interreligious understanding of God as the (non-personal) 
ground of being.13  
 
But for those who want to regard God as both ‘not less than personal’, in 
Philip Clayton’s phrase,14 and benevolent towards God’s creatures (caring 
for every sparrow that falls, to use an image beloved of Denis Edwards15), 
the presumption must be that God’s creation of disvalues results from an 
intrinsic constraint as to the field of possibilities in creation. Such a view 
would hold that if God could have created an alternative world with a 
balance of value against disvalue (actual or potential) tilted more in favour of 
value, God would have done so. Robin Attfield concludes that there is no 
                                                        
11 ‘Not necessary but inevitable’ is also a formulation to which Deane-
Drummond is attracted, see ‘Perceiving’. 
12 Southgate, Christopher, ‘In spite of all this, we will yearn for you’ in 
Tragedies and Christian Congregations: the practical theology of trauma ed. 
Megan Warner, Christopher Southgate, Carla A. Grosch-Miller and Hilary 
Ison (London: Routledge, 2020), Ch. 7.  
13 Wildman, Wesley J., In our own Image: Anthropomorphism, Apophaticism 
and Ultimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
14 Clayton, Philip and Knapp, Steven, The Predicament of Belief: science, 
philosophy, faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 22. 
15 Edwards, Denis, ‘Every Sparrow that Falls: The Cost of Evolution and the 
Christ-Event’, Ecotheology 11(1) (2006):103-123.       
evidence that such an alternative world exists.16 Robert Russell is concerned 
that it might, and therein lies his concern about putting too much weight on 
the ‘only way’ argument – that the evolutionary process was the only, or at 
least the optimal, way to give rise to the array of values we observe in the 
world (including those past values now disappeared).17 But this concern of 
Russell’s seems to me to underrate the force of the argument from God’s 
benevolence.     
 
Two other formulations of fallenness should be noted at this point. Ernst 
Conradie in his careful and ecologically aware explorations of the doctrine of 
sin explores the possibility of a ‘minimalist’ version of the Fall. He writes of a 
position that would hold that: 
 
things may not be perfect, but that this is the best that could be 
expected. This is a modification of Leibniz’s best of all possible worlds 
argument, now framed in evolutionary history as an upward trajectory 
from brutish savages to civilised common humanity. While this view is 
quite common, it does not exclude a critique of the present in the sense 
that moral progress could have been further advanced than it is.18 
 
This for Conradie would be the minimum basis for a discussion of the way 
the world is. Note the careful language – things could have been better than 
they now are. Compare this with Ted Peters, in a response to my recent 
reflections on divine glory. Peters says this: 
 
The more coherent route, in my judgment, is the one taken by 
[those]… who synthesize creation with redemption. Accordingly, the 
suffering we see in the disvaluing of evolutionary processes are signs 
of the world's alienation, estrangement, fallenness. One need not 
locate Adam and Eve in biological history to recognize that the world 
within which we live is not the creation promised in biblical symbols 
such as the Peaceable Kingdom or the New Creation. What is broken 
needs repair. What is alien needs to be brought home. What is 
estranged needs to be reconciled. What hurts needs to be healed. Only 
when redeemed, will our world be created.19 
 
                                                        
16 Attfield, Robin, Creation, Evolution and Meaning (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006), Ch. 7. 
17 Russell, Robert J., ‘Southgate’s Compound Only-Way Evolutionary 
Theodicy: Deep Appreciation and Further Directions’, Zygon 53(3) 
(2018):711-26.  
18 Conradie, Ernst, unpublished paper, quoted with permission. 
19 Peters, Ted, ‘Evolution, Suffering and Redemption: Sollereder, Southgate, 
and Russell on Theodicy’ Theology and Science, 17(2) (2019): 195-208.  
Note the language here: alienation, estrangement, brokenness - familiar 
imagery to describe the view not just that ‘things could be better than they 
are’ but that ‘the world is broken’. 
 
However, I contend that the creation as it has evolved over billions of years 
has been full of values of actual or potential beauty, creativity and 
ingenuity, full too of creaturely flourishing, accompanied by the competition, 
suffering and extinction that necessarily accompanies those values in a 
Darwinian world. Much about the human world has ‘gone wrong’ and 
manifested alienation, estrangement and brokenness, but the non-human 
world, while it manifests great disvalue in the form of creaturely suffering and 
extinction, does not manifest alienation or brokenness, except where humans 
have begun to inflict irreversible damage upon it. 
 
This view, then, supposes that there is a decisive difference between self-
conscious, freely-chosen acts of selfishness, violence, and cruelty, humans 
knowing the right and choosing to resist it, and the instinctive behaviours of 
other animals. So the classic single-act version of original sin can be 
modified to suggest that the multiplication of those conscious wrongs over 
time acts as a cumulative drag on the human spirit. Has the Fall thereby 
returned to the centre of the narrative? No, because this accumulation of 
human choices develops only towards the very end of the history of the 
natural world up to the present, and does not affect the fundamental 
character of that world. 
 
Peters however slips into that so tempting view that the disvalues in 
evolution show that something went wrong with the divine plan, and he calls 
as witnesses Barth’s Nichtige and Tillich’s ‘resistance of non-being’.20 I note 
above that it is not clear what these resistances amount to, but if they are 
powerful enough to frustrate God’s plan they pose severe problems for the 
Christian confession of a God who made absolutely everything out of 
absolutely nothing. Denis Edwards’ own instincts are I believe more secure 
here. He writes: ‘The divine act of creation can be understood as an act of 
love, by which the trinitarian Persons freely make space for creation and 
freely accept the limits of the process.’21 
 
This is a very important formulation, freeing us as it does both from the 
picture of God frustrated at not being able to create straw-eating lions,22 
and the cosmic-sadist caricatures of the God of evolution offered by atheist 
commentators.23  
 
                                                        
20 Peters, Ted, personal communication. 
21 Edwards, God of Evolution, pp. 41-2, italics mine. 
22 Southgate, Christopher, ‘Re-reading Genesis, John and Job: a Christian’s 
response to Darwinism’, Zygon 46(2) (2011):370-95.  
23 E.g. David L. Hull in ‘The God of the Galapagos’, calling the God of 
evolution ‘careless, wasteful, indifferent, almost diabolical’. Nature 352 
(August 1992):485-6.        
Nevertheless Peters identifies a key point. The most important challenge for 
new formulations of evolutionary theology is not to try and rescue some 
form of ‘mysterious fallenness’ to account for the apparent ‘alienation’ of the 
natural world, but rather to look at the Christian narrative afresh on the 
basis that this is indeed the sort of world God intended to create. How then 
is the drama of redemption to be set in register with that understanding of 
creation? I believe that that is the sort of quest Denis Edwards would have 
strongly endorsed and I am glad to be pursuing it in his memory. 
 
In a review of my recent work, Jonathan Chappel comments that: 
 
[t[he fact that creation requires ‘redemption’ surely undermines 
Southgate’s claim that the world as we see it now is as God originally 
intended it to be. For, if nothing has ever ‘gone wrong’ with creation, 
why does it need Christ to ‘redeem’ it? Is Christ ‘saving’ the world from 
the negative consequences of the system that He (as God) originally 
put in place? And why should humans strive to act in non-violent 
ways, when the use of violence has been sanctioned by God Himself?24  
 
Here we see well expressed the other aspect of the work that Fall-events do 
in so much Christian theology. Not only do they give accounts of a world 
apparently alienated from God, but they also explain the necessity of the 
rescue act that God performs in the Incarnation, Cross and Resurrection of 
Christ. So a necessary element of a ‘fall-free’ theology is a different type of 
formulation of the whole Christian narrative.  
 
On a fall-event-based scheme, sin and evil frustrate God’s attempt to create 
heaven (as symbolised by the myth of Eden). Jesus’ death and resurrection, 
by one of the mechanisms postulated in centuries of reflection on the 
atonement, breaks the opposing power and makes possible the 
reconciliation of all things (Col. 1.20). On a fall-free scheme, in which God 
creates, under constraint, the only sort of world capable of realising the 
values God desires, a world that is not ‘broken’, it is harder at first sight to 
see what work the Christ-event is doing. 
On this I take the view, which goes back at least to the twelfth century,25 
that the Incarnation can be thought of not as a rescue act of a wholly 
corrupted world but as planned by God from ‘before the foundation of the 
world’ (cf. Rev. 13.8) to make possible a new stage in the unfolding of the 
divine plan. The exact role of Christ’s atoning work on the Cross remains an 
area of major debate.26 But my approach finds a place for two profoundly 
important models. First for Christ’s example of utterly free human action, 
                                                        
24 Chappel, Jonathan, ‘Review of Theology in a Suffering World: Glory and 
Longing’, Science and Christian Belief 31(2) (2019): 213-6, quotation on 215. 
25 So Marilyn McCord Adams, Christ and Horrors: the coherence of Christology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Ch. 7. 
26 Importantly added to by Eleanore Stump, Atonement (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018). 
free because unconstrained by anything but the paths of love, and therefore 
truly ‘the image of God’ (2. Cor. 4.4), as the model for all human growth into 
freedom. Second, for Christ’s Cross and Resurrection as the triumph over 
‘the powers’ (Rom. 8.38; Col. 1.16; Eph. 6.12), or ‘Sin’ (Rom. 3.9; 5.21), 
which derive their influence over human action precisely from myriad un-
free choices made by human beings over the millennia.27 
Such a new formulation is also needed to answer what Robert Russell, 
writing about my compound theodicy, identifies as the most difficult and 
underexplored question raised by my approach, ‘why did God not just create 
heaven?’28 If God can give rise, eventually, to a reconciled and suffering-free 
creation, why did God not simply do so without the need for myriad 
instances of creaturely suffering? And as Russell and I both acknowledge,29 
there is a danger of such a scheme as mine seeming ‘broken-backed’, indeed 
crypto-Gnostic, in that the first creation is seen as flawed, such that it 
needs to be escaped from into a heavenly realm of existence.30 This is 
precisely what the early Christian theologians sought to reject in their 
insistence on a ‘very good’ creation ex nihilo, and, as the logical culmination 
of that position, original sin as the source of all disvalue. 
Russell picks up on my response to this problem, which is that ‘our guess 
must be that though heaven can eternally preserve those [creaturely] selves, 
subsisting in suffering-free relationship, it could not give rise to them in the 
first place.’31 In other words, the ‘only way’ argument needs to be boldly 
extended. An eventual reconciled cosmos required the era of struggle and 
suffering that is the first or ‘old’ creation, in order that it might give rise to 
the creaturely selves that can undergo transformation. 
Russell refers to this as ‘the “heaven requires earth” argument’ and 
continues:  
‘I believe it is an essential , and not just an ancillary, argument to 
Southgate’s overall theodicy… with this new element, Southgate’s 
theodicy insists that “heaven and earth” are held together as the 
domain of God’s creating and redeeming Spirit in which “all will be 
well.”…“Heaven requires earth” is, as best I know, an almost unique 
                                                        
27 I would also want to include a sense of God’s taking personal, and 
infinitely costly, responsibility for the disvalues in creation. See Southgate, 
Groaning, Ch. 4, and Young, Frances, God’s Presence: A Contemporary 
Recapitulation of Early Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), p. 247.  
 
28 Russell, Robert J., ‘Moving ahead on Christopher Southgate’s 
Evolutionary Theodicy’, Theology and Science 17(2) (2019): 185-94. 
29 Russell. ‘Moving Ahead’; Southgate, Christopher, Theology in a Suffering 
World: Glory and Longing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p.  
30 Russell’ ‘Moving Ahead’.     
 
31 Southgate, Groaning, p. 90. 
insight in the field of natural theodicy, and in natural and moral 
theodicy as a whole. It’s extraordinarily profound yet utterly simple 
claim is, to me at least, astonishing, liberating, and compelling… I 
suggest … the seventh argument “heaven requires earth” brings a 
deeper, more satisfying, and coherent completion to Southgate’s “only 
way” approach to evolutionary theodicy..’32  
Another aspect of this extension of the ‘only way’ argument is that one of the 
values that (it may be presumed) God desires the old creation to possess is 
‘redeemability’.33 The evolved world has to be such that an event starting 
with an incarnation of the divine Word could inaugurate a process of 
transformation leading to a new creation in which God ‘will be all in all’ (1. 
Cor. 15.28). 
Given the difficulty of formulating an account of the origins of disvalue in 
the natural world, it is not surprising that a range of figures emphasise 
instead eschatology, God’s ultimate redemptive purposes for this world. 
Four examples (differently motivated) are Russell;34 Peters;35 Edwards;36 and 
Messer.37 
Here again we can see a range of views of the transition by which God will 
give rise to the eschaton. There would be those who would emphasise the 
apocalyptic passages in the New Testament (especially in the Synoptics and 
Revelation) to insist that God’s consummating action, God’s final struggle 
with the powers leading the Last Judgment, will be sudden and soon. A 
period of terrible and bitter struggle gives way rapidly to the Parousia. The 
opposite emphasis would be found in those process thinkers who see the 
long persuasive work of God on the panpsychic flow of events in the 
universe as stretching out into the future with no dramatic transformation 
at all, perhaps not even any guarantee of the ultimate triumph of good over 
evil. John Haught has eloquently combined insights from process thought 
with the influence of Teilhard de Chardin in insisting that it is early days in 
the universe project. No dramatic transformation is in immediate view, only 
                                                        
32 Russell, ‘Moving Ahead’. 
33  Russell, Robert J., Cosmology: from alpha to omega (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2008), 308 check. 
34 On the basis that only eschatological redemption can guarantee a 
satisfactory theodicy. Russell, Cosmology, Ch. 8. 
35 Out of his sense of the ontological priority of the future, see Peters, Ted, 
God: the world’s future  DETAILS 
36 Because of his very strong sense of the compassion of God for all 
creatures. Edwards, ‘Every Sparrow’. 
37 I include him because he emphasises the eschatological vision of Isaiah 
11 as indicative of the true purposes of God, and therefore rejects any view 
in which God is the author of violence within creation. Messer, Neil, ‘Natural 
Evil after Darwin’ in Theology after Darwin ed. Michael Northcott and R.J. 
Berry (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2009), pp. 139-54. 
the slow outworking of the divine purpose towards a greater ‘rightness’. 
Haught writes, 
Theologically speaking, creation is still awakening—haltingly and not 
without setbacks—to rightness. The newly emergent sensitivity to life’s 
suffering… is all part of a single narrative of cosmic awakening. This 
recent conscious awakening to rightness must be taken into account 
whenever we ask what the universe is really all about.38  
For Russell, as also for John Polkinghorne, the transformation to a final 
harmonious state must be radical, because it involves the instantiation of 
new laws of nature, or a new destiny for matter (of which the Resurrection of 
Jesus may be seen as the prolepsis).39 Working as much from the 
considerations of physics as of theology, they argue that the transformation 
will involve profound elements of discontinuity with the present ordering of 
the universe.40 Russell has laid particular stress on the second law of 
thermodynamics as the physical principle that would need to be 
transformed if there is to be a state from which all struggle has been 
eliminated. In an analogous way Jürgen Moltmann has argued that 
evolution must stand in need of redeeming transformation, explicitly 
criticising both Teilhard and Rahner for supposing that evolutionary 
processes can lead to the eschaton.41 
Denis Edwards, following Rahner rather than Moltmann, wants to insist 
that the divine transformation of the cosmos will be as gradual as possible.42 
This I take to be because of Denis’s emphasis (characteristic of an 
ecotheologian as opposed to a theologian of physics) on the immanent 
presence of God in the world, informing all its processes, also perhaps 
because of his desire to retain an evolutionary unity to the overall narrative. 
My own position wants to combine different elements from across this 
spectrum of views. On the one hand, my scientific training tells me that 
Russell and Polkinghorne must be correct that the ultimate transformation 
of the fabric of the universe must be a radical one. On the other hand 
Edwards must be right in insisting that this transformation is not wrought 
by a God who is altogether ‘outside’ the cosmos, but rather by a God who 
immanently empowers its processes while all the while longing for the time 
when this immanence will acquire a new dimension – God ‘all in all’. 
                                                        
38 Haught, John, ‘Faith and Compassion in an Unfinished Universe’, Zygon 
53(3) (2018):782-91, quotation on 789. 
39 Russell, Cosmology Chs 9-10; Polkinghorne, John, The God of Hope and 
the End of the World (London: SPCK, 2002). 
40 See e.g. Russell, Cosmology, Ch. 10. 
41 Moltmann, Jürgen, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic 
Dimensions transl. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1990), pp. 292-305. 
42 Edwards, Denis, The God Who Acts: Creation, Redemption and Special 
Divine Action (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010), pp. 155-9. 
Haught is right to stress, with process thinkers, the long patience of God as 
the universe unfolds. And I have sympathy too with the much-criticized 
thought of Teilhard when he pictures a ‘noösphere’ in which human 
intelligence floods the world and is everywhere influential, as the 
penultimate state of the creation.43 The terrible current consequences of this 
extent of human influence, dramatically illustrated by plastic in the oceans 
and the intensification of hurricanes and forest fires by anthropogenic 
climate change, need no elaboration here. But I have long been struck by St 
Paul’s extraordinary insight in Rom. 8.19-22, that the current state of the 
creation, groaning in the labour pains of the birthing of something beyond 
the present, awaits ‘the freedom of the glory of the children of God’ 
(v.21NRSV). 
This can be read as suggesting that the interim phase in the eschatological 
redemption of all things, the phase preceding the final radical 
transformation involving the laws of physics themselves, is a phase most to 
do with the transformation of the human spirit, the discovery in human 
beings of what true freedom consists of. For that the non-human creation is 
made to wait. 
So for all the importance of the ‘deep incarnation movement’, starting with 
the work of Niels Gregersen and taken forward by Denis Edwards in his last 
writings – for all the importance of Christ’s identification with ‘all flesh’, 
indeed all matter - the crucial influence of incarnation and atonement on 
the Christian narrative proves to be on human beings. A fine and precious 
thread of authentic, Christ-like freedom is offered whereby humans can be 
led out of the labyrinth of limit, guilt and shame that has so characterised 
human experience.44 
This is, as Edwards has so importantly emphasised, the work not of some 
magical-miracle-working external God, but of the immanent Spirit. Here I 
am able to make a link with Denis’s most recent writing. It is gratifying that 
his ‘theological response’ (rather than ‘theodicy’) in respect of the problem of 
evolution includes many of the same elements as mine. And when Denis 
demurs from the ‘only way’ argument as the first step in the construction of 
an evolutionary theodicy, he makes in effect the same step as I make in my 
most recent reflection on the subject, admitting a greater element of negative 
theology into the response to suffering, and therefore making a less bold 
theodical response.45 I agree with Denis moreover that the heart of the 
                                                        
43 I bracket out considerations of extraterrestrial civilisations and their 
possible need for redemption. As we still lack any evidence that these exist, I 
frame my theology for the present in terms of what we do know about the 
cosmos. 
44 Cf. Fiddes, Paul S., Freedom and Limit: a dialogue between literature and 
Christian doctrine (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991); also Stump, 
Atonement. 
45 Edwards, Denis, Deep Incarnation (Australian Theological Forum, 
forthcoming); Southgate, Christopher, Theology in a Suffering World, pp. 3-4. 
human vocation in Spirit-given freedom must be that ‘[h]uman beings are 
called to participate in God’s love and action towards the wider creation in 
an ecological commitment to the healing and flourishing of the planetary 
community of life’.46 The terrible urgency of this is now all too clear, and 
tragically evident in Denis’s own land of Australia, in the grip as I write this 
of catastrophic mega-fires. 
To summarise then, the shape of this Christian story in dialogue with 
evolution is as follows: 
There have been three great phases in God’s action in the world. First, the 
creating, sustaining, and protecting from ultimate catastrophe of the ‘old 
creation’, which operates with the physical laws with which we are familiar, 
and the biological process of Darwinian evolution. Among the products of 
this process are self-conscious freely-choosing organisms with an 
(admittedly flawed) God-consciousness, Homo Sapiens Sapiens. Humans, 
evolving in a vastly long (and necessary) evolutionary process, and inheriting 
from their evolution a mixture of drives including both the altruistic and the 
cruel, violent and selfish, could have their freedom of will brought to 
authentic fruition only by the second of God’s great actions. 
In this, God offered out of pure self-giving love the perfect example of the 
Incarnate Son. That example, and the Son’s victory, through pure 
persistence in his Passion and divine deliverance in his Resurrection, over 
the powers of sin and death, transforms the scope of human possibility. 
However, the transformation of the world, though profound, is not 
immediately apparent. The processes of the old creation go on. Christ’s 
victory has to grow ‘soul by soul and silently’ in the long process by which 
the intensified immanence of the Spirit47 works with human wills to make 
that authentic freedom a reality. And that enigmatic Pauline passage from 
Rom. 8 on which I have drawn suggests that, for whatever reason in the 
mystery of the divine economy, the radical transformation of the cosmos by 
which it will attain its final harmonious state, awaits this human growth 
into freedom, ‘the freedom of the glory of the children of God’. 
Only then, so this model supposes, will come the third great action of God, 
the radical transformation of the physical universe, some laws retained and 
others, such as the second law of thermodynamics, suspended, such that 
(resurrected) bodily existence is possible without suffering or struggle. In 
this final state God is present to creatures in a yet more intense way, but 
without depriving them of individuality. 
Note that the second phase is impossible without the first, and the third 
without the second. This is a narrative without a human fall from perfection 
as the source of all creaturely suffering. But I suggest that it is at least as 
consistent with Scripture and reason as the classic U-shaped evangel of the 
                                                        
46 Edwards, Deep Incarnation.  
47 Made possible by the Christ-event, and by the Resurrection and 
Ascension, cf. Jn 16.7. 
Western tradition. It belongs within a family of such positions to which 
Denis Edwards’ work has been and will continue to be a distinguished 
contribution. I am deeply thankful to have known him. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
